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Paine.: Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergenceof the Imper

defense were functionalists, and Eisenhower viewed their primary role as one
of keeping the Pentagon programs
within the budget, which was important
for carrying out his conservative fiscal
goals. On strategic matters, Eisenhower
dealt directly with the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus usurped
an important portion of the secretary of
defense’s role. He respected his secretaries as businessmen but in effect insisted on being his own secretary of
defense.
Thematic throughout this collection is a
focus on Asia and Europe. By stressing
Eisenhower’s response to grand strategy,
relations with Moscow, the interrelationship of politico-military-industrial
and techno-scientific affairs, and trouble spots in Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia, the book ignores the
twenty-first-century challenges posed
for contemporary U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Southern Hemisphere—Africa and Latin America.
For the sophisticated and knowledgeable scholar, Forging the Shield likely
contains little new information, but it
will prove valuable to defense policy
and military history students needing
exposure to the Eisenhower era.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

author of President Eisenhower
and Strategy Management

Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Politics,
Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 1868–1922. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2005. 283pp. $57.95

Charles Schencking, in charting Japan’s
creation of the world’s third-largest
navy by 1922, illuminates the workings
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of the Japanese political system and the
evolution of both interservice rivalries
and civil-military relations in the decades preceding World War II. He bases
his history on an impressive reading of
Japanese and English-language primary
and secondary sources to produce a
story with political implications far beyond the history of one service.
When the Meiji reformers took power
in 1868, their minimal naval forces
were part of their land forces. In 1871,
over the objections of the army, the
Military Ministry was subdivided into
two ministries, army and navy. In order
to secure funding to create a modern
fleet, the navy soon allied with the Satsuma clans, while clans from ChÇshÇ
were already allied with the army.
Together these clans brought the Meiji
reformers to power. The opening of the
Diet in 1890 brought fears among the
clans that democracy would erode their
power. Therefore, they solidified their
ties with the army and navy. Thus
highly politicized interservice rivalries
were inherent in the Japanese political
system.
Initial Diets were hostile to military
funding. War with China in 1894–95,
however, transformed the public perception of the navy from a financial
burden into a service vital to Japan’s
national security and domestic prosperity. This, combined with the large war
indemnity from China, produced massive naval budgetary increases. The naval mission expanded from defense of
the home islands to command of the
sea and defense of the empire. The
navy continued to press for a combat
mission independent of the army,
which retained responsibility for national defense and command over
naval forces in wartime. Interservice
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rivalries intensified. The navy assiduously cultivated popular support
among politicians, journalists, disenfranchised former samurai, and entrepreneurs who dreamed of an empire in
the South Seas.
The navy used World War I to seize
German colonies and implement its
“southward advance” strategy for expanding the empire in the Pacific region. The war also transformed Japan
from a debtor into a creditor nation.
These changed circumstances finally allowed a Seiyãkai-navy alliance to deliver
greatly increased postwar naval budgets. Previously, the naval budget had
occasionally exceeded the army budget,
but from 1917 to 1922 it did so consistently and massively.
In response to those who believe that
Japan’s military muzzled its civil leaders
in World War II and that this accounts
for Japan’s rampage through the Pacific, Schencking’s book shows that the
political parties had always worked
closely with the military and that, conversely, the military had always been
deeply involved in politics. This meant
ever-deepening interservice rivalries,
and also incomplete and incompatible
war plans that would spell disaster for
Japan and much of Asia and the Pacific
in World War II.
For nonspecialists, additional allusions
to political and budgetary issues beyond
naval appropriations would have put
the subject of the book into a broader
context. Nevertheless, Schencking provides one of the best descriptions of the
inner workings of the Japanese political
system that I have ever read. It details the
creation of the modern Japanese navy, the
civil-military politics necessary for its development, the consequent army-navy
rivalries, and the implications for the
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Japanese political system and for future
Japanese military strategy.
S. C. M. PAINE

Strategy and Policy Department
Naval War College

Black, Jeremy. The British Seaborne Empire. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press,
2004. 420pp. $40
Jeremy Black deliberately titled his book
to link it with two classics, works that
every maritime historian knows: C. R.
Boxer’s The Dutch Seaborne Empire
(1965) and J. H. Parry’s The Spanish
Seaborne Empire (1966). The planned
volume in that series that would have
provided an overview of the British
Empire was never completed, although
nearly twenty years later D. B. Quinn
and A. N. Ryan filled the gap for the
early phase with their England’s Sea
Empire, 1550–1642 (1983). Black’s contribution shows a significantly different
approach as well as a much broader and
more nuanced view of the general theme.
Jeremy Black is a prolific writer who
has become widely known for his
broad, sweeping histories of British foreign policy in the eighteenth century
and of the history of European and
world warfare, as well as for his insightful studies of maps and cartography. He
is fully experienced and eminently well
qualified to attempt a broad-based
study such as this.
Although Black’s title suggests a general
history of the British Empire, his detailed focus is not on the earliest period
but on the three hundred years from
the Union of Scotland and England in
1707 to the present. To provide linkages,
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